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Clarifying What is “Clear”: Reconsidering
Whistleblower Protections Under Dodd-Frank
I. INTRODUCTION
“Honesty is the best policy—when there is the most money in
1

it.”

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) seems to
fully support this statement. The 2014 fiscal year was a momentous one
for whistleblower actions with over 3,600 whistleblower tips received
and a record-breaking whistleblower award.2 In September 2014, the
SEC announced an award of more than $30 million,3 more than double
the previous record of $14 million in 2013.4 The Chief of the SEC
Office of the Whistleblower, Sean McKessy, “hope[s] that awards like
this one will incentivize company and industry insiders, or others who
may have knowledge of possible federal securities law violations, both
in the [United States] and abroad, to come forward and report their
information promptly to the Commission.”5
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”),6 Congress sought to increase
corporate accountability and transparency by incentivizing the reporting
of potential securities law violations.7 To do this, the whistleblower
program provides for “monetary awards, retaliation protection, and
Mark Twain Tells of His Business Ventures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1901, at 2.
OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1–3 (2014),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf.
3. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Announces Largest-Ever
Whistleblower
Award
(Sept.
22,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543011290#.VC9e0PldXg
k.
4. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC to Pay $30 Million Whistleblower Award, Its Largest
Yet, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-pay-30-millionwhistleblower-award-its-largest-yet-1411406612.
5. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
7. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010).
1.
2.
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confidentiality protection.”8 It is unclear, however, who is considered a
whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections.9
Courts have split within the last few years over whether a whistleblower
must report suspected violations directly to the SEC, or if internal
reporting is sufficient to claim the benefits of Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provisions.10 In Asadi v. G.E. Energy,11 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed the narrow definition of
“whistleblower” found in § 78u–6(a)(6) (“Definition Section”) of DoddFrank, holding that an employee must report directly to the SEC to be
protected by Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions. This narrow
Definition Section directly conflicts with § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (“Antiretaliation Section”),12 which permits a civil action by an employee for
an adverse employment action if the employee has made an internal
disclosure protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).13
SOX provides protection for whistleblowers who report only internally
and not to the SEC.14 To reconcile this conflict, district courts in the
First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the Antiretaliation Section extends protections under Dodd-Frank to those who
choose to report internally and not directly to the SEC.15 The Fifth
Circuit, however, is the only circuit court that has addressed who is
protected by Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions.16 Thus, currently
OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2, at 1.
Steve Kardell, 2014: A Big Year in Whistleblower Laws, JDSUPRA BUS.
ADVISOR (June 5, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2014-a-big-year-inwhistleblower-laws-52978/.
10. Id.
11. 720 F.3d 620, 625–26 (5th Cir. 2013).
12. This Note focuses on one of three categories of protected actions listed in the antiretaliation provisions found in Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 922(h)(1)(A), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). The
Anti-retaliation Section refers to only Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
14. Id.
15. See Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y 2014); Khazin v.
TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at *6
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-SN, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168840, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4 2014); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp.,
No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014); Verfuerth
v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-C-352, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156620, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov.
4, 2014); Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *1
(D. Colo. July 19, 2013).
16. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear an interlocutory appeal on the issue and the
Second Circuit denied an appeal on other grounds. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, No.
8.
9.
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in some jurisdictions, employees must report to the SEC to be protected
under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.17
This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s holding should be
disregarded and the definition of a whistleblower should be expanded to
include those who report potential securities laws violations internally,
in addition to those who report directly to the SEC.18 This Note
proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the differences between the antiretaliation provisions of SOX and Dodd-Frank.19 Part III provides an
overview of the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in adopting a
restrictive definition of whistleblower in Asadi.20 Part IV discusses how
the majority of courts choose not to follow the Fifth Circuit after
correctly applying either the two step process set forth in Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.21 or the new textualism
doctrine.22 Part V concludes with an analysis of the practical
implications of a narrow definition for employees, employers’ internal
compliance programs, and the SEC.23
II. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS: SOX AND DODD-FRANK
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions were not Congress’s
first attempt to protect corporate whistleblowers.24 Section 806 of SOX
provides that “no company . . . may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any

8:12-CV-238, 2014 WL 3548278, at *1 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014) (interlocutory appeal
denied); Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013)
(holding Dodd-Frank does not apply interterritorially). There is currently an appeal in the
Third Circuit, where the SEC has filed an amicus brief in favor of overruling the Fifth
Circuit’s narrow definition of a whistleblower. Brief for the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, Safarian v. American DG Energy, No. 14-2734
(3rd Cir. Dec. 12, 2014).
17. Id.
18. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Stephen M. Kohn, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Legal Protection for Corporate
WHISTLEBLOWERS
CTR.,
Whistleblowers,
NAT’L
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2014).
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lawful act done by the employee.”25 This SOX anti-retaliation
provision protects employees of public companies and their
subsidiaries26 who internally report potential securities law violations.27
Dodd-Frank includes anti-retaliation protections that mirror the SOX
protections.28 Dodd-Frank also created a bounty program,29 which
recently resulted in an over $30 million reward, that provides a
monetary incentive for whistleblowers who report directly to the SEC.30
Under the bounty program, a whistleblower whose original information
leads to successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative
action is entitled to receive between 10% and 30% of the monetary
sanctions imposed.31 Therefore, whistleblowers are more likely to bring
a claim under Dodd-Frank because of its plaintiff-friendly benefits.32
There are three key differences between SOX and Dodd-Frank
that could influence under which law an employee decides to bring a
claim.33 First, under SOX, an employee may be eligible to receive back
pay following a retaliatory discharge,34 while under Dodd-Frank, the

25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012).
26. SOX provisions provide “anti-retaliation protections for employees of public

companies, subsidiaries whose financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of public companies, and nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34304 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249) (emphasis added).
27. See Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2013) (offering whistleblower protection for violations of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank
fraud, federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders, or any rule or regulation of the
Securities and Exchange Commission); SOX § 806(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C).
28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
29. The monetary award program is separate from the retaliation protections. It does
not require an adverse employment action to receive an award under Dodd-Frank. The antiretaliation provisions are meant to protect employees, who may be motivated by the reward,
that suffer an adverse employment action as a result of coming forward. See Dodd-Frank §
922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6; OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2.
30. LINDA SHEN, WEIL, GOTSHALL & MANGES LLP, UPDATE: COURTS CONTINUE TO BE
DIVIDED OVER THE SCOPE OF DODD-FRANK’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS 4 (July 2014),
available at https://interact.weil.com/reaction/mailings/Employer_Update_July_2014.pdf.
31. Dodd-Frank § 922(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
32. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014).
33. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013).
34. Back pay damages under are restitutionary damages intended to “make the
employee whole.” Walton v. Nova Info. Sys., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Tenn.
2007). The back pay awarded is the amount the whistleblower “would have received had
their employment not been terminated.” Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d
796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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employee is eligible for double the back pay.35 Second, under SOX, an
employee must first file a claim with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”).36 If 180 days pass without a final
agency order, then the whistleblower may file an action in federal
district court.37 Dodd-Frank, on the other hand, gives a whistleblower
direct access to district court to file a claim.38 Third, the statute of
limitations under SOX to report a claim is 180 days from the violation
or knowledge of the violation.39 Dodd-Frank requires an action be
brought no more than six years after the date on which the violation
occurred or no more than three years after the material facts of the
violation first became known.40 The statute of limitations period,
however, cannot be tolled for more than ten years after the date on
which the violation occurred.41
Federal courts are split on whether the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provisions apply to whistleblowers who only report internally
and not to the SEC.42 The Dodd-Frank Definition Section defines a
whistleblower as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals
acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the
securities laws43 to the [SEC], in a manner established, by rule or
35. Compare Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), with SOX
§ 806(c)(2)(B), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B).
36. SOX § 806(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMIN. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OHSA FACT SHEET: FILING WHISTLEBLOWER
COMPLAINTS UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter FILING
WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS], available at https://www.osha.gov/Publications/oshafactsheet-sox-act.pdf.
37. FILING WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS, supra note 36, at 2.
38. Shen, supra note 30, at 4.
39. SOX § 806(b)(2)(D), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D); FILING WHISTLEBLOWER
COMPLAINTS, supra note 36, at 2.
40. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
§ 922(h)(1)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
41. Id.
42. Catherine Foti, If You See Something, Say Something, But Maybe Only to the SEC,
JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (June 19, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/if-yousee-something-say-something-but-77891/.
43. It also has been recently held that to be protected by Dodd-Frank, an employee’s
disclosure must “relate to a violation of the securities laws.” Zillges v. Kenney Bank &
Trust, No. 13-C-1287, 2014 WL 2515403, at *5 (E.D. Wis. June 4, 2014). This is not a new
development since the statute, courts, and the SEC use the phrase “securities laws” when
referring to the violations that must be reported. See Dodd-Frank § 922(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. §
78u-6(a)(6); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300,
34300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249); see, e.g., Nollner v. S.
Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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regulation, by the [SEC].”44 Dodd-Frank also outlines three categories
of protected actions protecting, whistleblowers from employer
retaliation for any act taken by the whistleblower
(i) in providing information to the Commission in
accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the
Commission based upon or related to such information;
or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.45
Despite this language, the Anti-retaliation Section appears to
protect employees who have not reported to the SEC46 because the SOX
provisions protect internal disclosures made to “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee.”47 Thus, the Dodd-Frank Antiretaliation Section directly conflicts with the Definition Section that
requires reporting to the SEC.48 Although most courts have resolved
this conflict by holding that the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section
protects internal reports made under SOX, the Fifth Circuit in Asadi
applied a strict interpretation of the statute and rejected the notion that a
conflict existed.49
To clarify these conflicting provisions, the SEC promulgated
regulations in 2011 that clarified the scope of whistleblower programs
to potential whistleblowers.50 According to the SEC’s regulations, you
44. Dodd-Frank § 922(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
45. Dodd-Frank § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
46. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL

940703, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014).
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) § 806(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C)
(2012).
48. Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 25, 2013).
49. Catherine Foti, When Is a ‘Whistleblower’ Not Really a ‘Whistleblower’?, FORBES
(Aug. 7, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/08/07/when-is-awhistleblower-not-really-a-whistleblower/.
50. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300
(June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
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are a whistleblower if you have a reasonable belief of a possible
securities law violation, and if you have provided information in any
manner described in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section
whistleblower provisions, which includes reports made under SOX.51
While the majority of courts have accepted and deferred to the SEC’s
regulations, a minority of courts have held that the Anti-retaliation
Section only protects employees who report directly to the SEC.52
III. FIFTH CIRCUIT: REQUIRING WHISTLEBLOWERS TO REPORT TO THE
SEC
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to five
federal district courts,53 that employees who only reported internally and
not to the SEC were not protected under the Dodd-Frank Antiretaliation Section.54 Asadi, an employee at General Electric Energy
(“G.E. Energy”), reported a potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”) violation internally to his supervisor.55 Shortly thereafter, he
began receiving negative performance reviews and was subsequently
fired.56 Asadi asserted that G.E. Energy violated Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower protection provisions by retaliating after he reported the
potential FCPA violation to his supervisor, but not the SEC.57 The Fifth
Circuit held that Asadi was not entitled to protection under Dodd-Frank
because he did not provide information directly to the SEC.58
The Fifth Circuit began and ended its analysis with the
determination that the statutory language in Dodd-Frank was plain and
unambiguous.59 Asadi conceded that he was not within the Dodd-

51. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(i)
(2014) (referring to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) §922(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012)).
52. Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153439, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014).
53. Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Kramer v. Trans–Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL
4444820, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
54. Foti, supra note 49.
55. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
56. Id.
57. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.
58. Foti, supra note 42.
59. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.

222

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 19

Frank’s definition of a whistleblower since he did not report directly to
the SEC.60 Nevertheless, he argued that employees who took the
actions listed in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section were
protected.61 Specifically, Asadi argued he was entitled to antiretaliation protection as an employee who reported a potential securities
law violation to his superiors because Dodd-Frank incorporates the
SOX whistleblower provisions.62 The Fifth Circuit stated that Asadi
was “correct that individuals may take [a] protected activity yet still not
qualify as a whistleblower,” but maintained the term “whistleblower”
must be defined narrowly.63 As a result, retaliation is prohibited only
for actions taken by whistleblowers who report to the SEC in
accordance with the Definition Section.64
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress’s repeated use of the
term “whistleblower” in the Anti-retaliation Section was intentional.65
According to this section, “[n]o employer may discharge . . . or in any
other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower . . . because of any
lawful act done by the whistleblower.”66 Had Congress used the terms
“individual” or “employee,” then Asadi’s interpretation of the
whistleblower protections would make more sense.67 “The use of such
broader terms would indicate that Congress intended any individual or
employee—not just those individuals or employees who qualify as a
‘whistleblower’—to be protected from retaliatory actions by their
employers.”68 Because of this strict reading of the text, the court held
that Dodd-Frank only protects actions and disclosures listed in the Antiretaliation Section if the employee also disclosed information to the
SEC.69
To reach its interpretation, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the
Definition Section and Anti-retaliation Section using two key canons of

60. Id. at 624.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 626.
63. Id. at 627.
64. Id. at 629.
65. Id. at 626 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

(Dodd-Frank) § 922(h)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012)).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 627.
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statutory construction.70 The court not only tried to interpret the two
sections in “a manner that render[ed] them compatible, not
contradictory,”71 but also tried to prevent any phrase from becoming
“superfluous, void, or insignificant.”72 Asadi argued that by requiring
an employee to report to the SEC in the Definition Section, the Antiretaliation Section is rendered moot.73 The court noted, however, that
Asadi’s reading not only makes the words “provide information . . . to
the Commission” superfluous, but also undermines SOX as a whole.74
If the Anti-retaliation Section incorporated SOX whistleblower
provisions for all employees, no individual would ever choose to raise a
SOX anti-retaliation claim over a Dodd-Frank claim.75
To avoid surplusage, the Fifth Circuit gave effect to every word
in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions by clarifying that internal
reporting under the Anti-retaliation Section only protects who report to
the SEC.76 The court posed a hypothetical of a mid-level manager who
reported securities law violations to his company’s CEO and to the
SEC.77 If the manager was fired before the CEO knew of the report to
the SEC,78 the manager could still bring a claim under the Dodd-Frank
Anti-retaliation Section.79 The manager met the requirement in the
Definition Section of reporting to the SEC, but was retaliated against for
internal reporting, which is a protected action under the Anti-retaliation
Section.80 The manager would still have the option to bring either a
SOX or Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation claim.81
In interpreting the Dodd-Frank Definition Section and Antiretaliation Section, the court used traditional tools of statutory
70. Id. at 622.
71. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133

(2000)).
Id. (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 627.
The SEC has pointed out that this causes a problem because “if an employer is
genuinely unaware that the employee has separately disclosed to the Commission, any
adverse employment action that the employer takes would appear to lack the requisite
retaliatory intent—i.e., the intent to punish the employee for engaging in a protected
activity.” Brief of the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, supra note 16, at 23.
79. Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 627–28.
80. Id. at 628.
81. Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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construction, but failed to truly follow the process outlined in the
landmark case of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.82
Because of this, courts widely cite Asadi when considering the issue of
who qualifies for Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections, but the
majority of federal district courts faced with the issue have declined to
follow Asadi’s interpretation.83 Instead, courts are choosing to defer to
the SEC’s regulations that expand the definition of “whistleblower.”84
District courts are left without much guidance as the Fifth Circuit is the
only circuit that has ruled on this issue.85 Both the Court of Appeals for
the Second and Eighth Circuits had the opportunity to clarify
whistleblower protections, but both chose instead to sidestep the issue.86
In Liu v. Siemens AG,87 the Second Circuit held that DoddFrank does not apply extraterritorially to a plaintiff who was a citizen of
Taiwan, who worked for a Chinese corporation that had shares listed on
the New York Stock Exchange.88 In its opinion, the Second Circuit did
not address the debate over the whistleblower
definition.89
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit refused to resolve the issue of whether
an employee must report to the SEC to be protected by the Dodd-Frank
82.

Id. at 630; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984).
83. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014)
(protecting internal reports); Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (same); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013) (same). But
see Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., No. 14-C-352, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156620, at *1,
(E.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2014) (requiring reports be made to the SEC); Englehart v. Career Educ.
Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 2619501, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014)
(same).
84. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014);
Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
85. Catherine Foti, Did the Summer Shine Any Light on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
(Sept.
11,
2014,
3:35
PM),
Land?, FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/09/11/did-the-summer-shine-any-light-on-doddfrank-whistleblower-land/.
86. Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens, 2014 WL 3953672, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2014);
Bussing v. COR Clearing, L.L.C., 2014 WL 3548278, at *2 (D. Neb. July 17, 2014)
(interlocutory appeal denied); Bryan House et al., A Review of Recent Whistleblower
Developments,
JDSUPRA
BUS.
ADVISOR
(Oct.
3,
2014),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-review-of-recent-whistleblower-develop-40972/.
87. Siemens, 2014 WL 3953672.
88. House et al., supra note 86.
89. CHRISTOPHER MCEACHRAN, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, SECOND CIRCUIT DECIDES
DODD-FRANK DOES NOT APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY, SKIPS ADDRESSING WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION FOR INTERNAL REPORTING (Sept. 23, 2014), available at
http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/sec/second-circuit-decides-dodd-frank-does-not-applyextraterritorially-skips-addressing-whistleblower-protection-for-internal-reporting.
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whistleblower protections when it declined to hear an interlocutory
appeal.90 In December 2014, the SEC filed an amicus brief for a
pending appeal in the Third Circuit in support of overruling the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation.91
Since there is only one federal court of appeals case, district
courts have split on how to define “whistleblower.”92 In the Tenth
Circuit, the District Court for the District of Colorado has decided two
cases that contradict each other.93 Additionally, in the Second Circuit,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York has multiple
conflicting judgments.94 To promote uniformity in court decisions,
courts should either correctly apply the Chevron process, or choose to
follow the growing trend of new textualism95 and extend Dodd-Frank
anti-relation protections both to employees who report only internally as
well as those who report directly to the SEC.

90. Bussing, 2014 WL 3548278, at *2; Yin Wilczek, Federal Appeals Court Declines
to Hear Case on Dodd-Frank Definition of ‘Whistle-Blower’, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No.
09, at 503 (Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that the Bussing case will continue in Nebraska district
court).
91. Steven Pearlman & Noa Baddish, SEC’s Second Amicus Brief on Whether DoddFrank Protects Internal Reports, PROSKAUER (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.whistleblowerdefense.com/2014/12/22/secs-second-amicus-brief-on-whether-dodd-frank-protectsinternal-reports/.
92. See Wagner v. Bank of Am. Corp, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6 (D. Colo. July 19,
2013). But see Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May
12, 2014).
93. See Wagner, 2013 WL 3786643, at *7 (following Asadi in holding violations must
be reported to the SEC). But see Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo.
2013) (holding the Anti-retaliation Section was an exception to the Definition Section of
Dodd-Frank).
94. See Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 531 (S.D.N.Y. May 8,
2014) (protecting internal reports under Dodd-Frank); Rosenblum v. Thomas Reuters
(Mkts.) L.L.C., 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013); Murray v. UBS Secs.,
L.L.C., 2013 WL 2190084, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); see also Egan v. Tradingscreen,
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist., 2011 WL 1672066, at*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). But see Berman v.
Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115078, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014)
(denying whistleblower protections).
95. See infra Part IV.B.
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IV. JUSTIFYING THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS WHO REPORT
INTERNALLY

A.

Applying the Chevron Process

When courts review statutory provisions such as the DoddFrank Definition Section and Anti-retaliation Sections where Congress
has delegated legislative power to an agency, the court must defer to the
agency unless the agency’s interpretation is “manifestly contrary to the
statute.”96 To determine if the construction is permissible, courts must
apply the two-step process set forth in Chevron.97 First, the court must
ask whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”98 If Congress’s intent is clear, the court’s analysis ends.99
However, if there is any ambiguity in the statute about Congress’s
intent, then the court must proceed to the second step of Chevron and
ask if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is “reasonable.”100 In
Chevron, the Court held that if Congress delegated the power to create
and interpret laws, courts must defer to reasonable interpretations.”101
Asadi did not follow the Chevron process, but instead used
canons of statutory construction to avoid contradicting sections of the
statute and surplusage.102 The Chevron court established that courts
have the power to use “traditional tools of statutory construction” but
Chevron only used legislative history to determine Congress’s intent.103
The Asadi court failed to review Congress’s intentions for passing the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections.104 Little evidence of Congress’s
intent exists in its legislative history,105 but according to the Senate
Report, The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Dodd96.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44

(1984).
97. Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive
Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 576–80 (1998).
98. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
99. Id. at 842–43.
100. Id. at 844.
101. Mank, supra note 97, at 578.
102. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013).
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 n.9, 851.
104. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625.
105. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
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Frank “aims to motivate those with inside knowledge to come forward
and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have
violated securities laws and recover money for victims of financial
fraud.”106 The Fifth Circuit did not continue to Chevron step two and
noted that it was not persuaded by Asadi’s argument for deference to
the agency’s interpretation because the use of “whistleblower” in the
federal regulations was inconsistent.107 Therefore, by failing to defer to
a reasonable agency interpretation of the statute, Asadi did not correctly
apply the Chevron two-step test.
Asadi represents one of two possible interpretations of the
relationship between the Definition Section and the Anti-retaliation
Section.108 Some courts followed Asadi in holding that the Definition
Section identifies who is a whistleblower, while the Anti-retaliation
Section identifies what actions are protected for whistleblowers.109
Contrastingly, the majority of courts choose not to follow Asadi and
hold that the Anti-retaliation Section could be viewed “as a narrow
exception” to the Definition Section.110 As a result, in most
jurisdictions, an employee must prove he either reported to the SEC or
that his disclosure was in the categories outlined in the Anti-retaliation
Section.111 The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions are facially
ambiguous because they can be interpreted as contradictory.112
Furthermore, “[t]he existence of these competing, plausible
interpretations of the statutory provisions compels the conclusion that
the statutory text is ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.”113
Because the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections are ambiguous,
courts must proceed to the second step of Chevron.
Under the second step of Chevron, the reviewing court should
defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “reasonable.”114 The
106. S. REP NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010).
107. Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.
108. Yang v. Navigators Grp, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
109. Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at *8 (M.D. Fla. May 12,

2014).
110. Murray v. UBS Secs., L.L.C., 2013 WL 2190084, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013)
(quoting Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4.
113. Id. (quoting Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. See Yang v. Navigators Grp, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding that the SEC’s interpretation of whistleblower definition was reasonable).
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SEC promulgated regulations in 2011 that “defined certain terms critical
to the operation of the whistleblower program . . . and generally
explained the scope of the whistleblower program to the public and to
potential whistleblowers.”115 According to the SEC’s regulations,
individuals are whistleblowers if they have a reasonable belief of a
possible securities law violation, and if they provided information in
any manner described in the Dodd-Frank Anti-retaliation Section
whistleblower provisions, which includes internal reporting.116 The
SEC clarified how the “statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to
three different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category
includes individuals who report to persons or governmental authorities
other than the Commission.”117 Specifically, the SEC clarified that the
Anti-retaliation Section expands the definition of a whistleblower,
giving employees the benefit of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provisions for reports made both internally and to the SEC.118
In determining the reasonableness of the SEC’s interpretation,
the court must ask if the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible
construction of the statute.”119 The court should not disturb the
agency’s interpretation unless it contradicts Congress’s intent.120 As
previously stated, Congress intended for Dodd-Frank to encourage
employees with information about potential securities law violations to
come forward.121 In creating the regulations that were passed in 2011,
the SEC recognized that “anyone can, and should, be able to report to
law enforcement at any time, while at the same time recognizing that
companies and whistleblowers have good reasons to want complaints
reported internally.”122 In recognizing the value and efficiency of
115. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300
(proposed June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
116. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)
(2014) (referring to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012)).
117. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34304
(emphasis added).
118. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2014 WL 940703, at *15–16 (D.N.J.
Mar. 11, 2014); Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34304
(“However, the retaliation protections for internal reporting afforded by Section
21F(h)(1)(A) do not broadly apply to employees of entities other than public companies.”).
119. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
120. Id. at 844.
121. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010).
122. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech on Incentivizing
Whistleblowers to Bring Fraud to Light (May 25, 2011).
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corporate compliance programs in monitoring potential violations, the
SEC regulations encourage whistleblowers to report internally when
appropriate, but still allows whistleblowers to go directly to the SEC.123
Furthermore, to encourage participation in internal compliance
programs, the SEC regulations incentivize reporting internally by
providing protections for whistleblowers while maintaining employees
eligibility for the bounty program without reporting to the SEC.124
Under Dodd-Frank, an employee must report information
directly to the SEC to qualify as a whistleblower eligible for awards125
under § 240.21F-9.126 The SEC’s regulations expand eligibility of the
bounty program by providing that a whistleblower can receive a reward
if the employee reports internally and the company later relays that
information to the SEC.127 Moreover, if an employee chooses to report
internally and later reports to the SEC within 120 days, the regulation
contains a look back provision that deems the employee to have
“provided information as of the date of [his] original disclosure.”128
Furthermore, courts can consider participation, or lack thereof, in
internal compliance systems as a factor in deciding whether to reduce or
decline an award.129
The SEC hoped that with these incentives, employees would
report internally and that internal compliance programs could continue
123. Mary Shapiro, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Statement at SEC Open
Meeting: Item 2 –Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011).
124. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34300–
01 (proposed June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
125. Asadi referenced the SEC’s regulations but claimed the inconsistencies in the way
the regulations defined “whistleblower” did not strengthen the argument for an expanded
whistleblower definition because it could not “reasonably effectuat[e] Congress’s intent.”
Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2007). Section 240.21F-2(b)(1) seemed
to expand the definition of a whistleblower while § 240.21F-9 still required the employee to
report to the SEC. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.21F-2(b), 240.21F-9 (2014). In Chevron, it was noted that the EPA could use a broader
definition for some purposes and a narrower definition for other purposes. Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 856 (1984). Similarly,
“whistleblower” in § 240.21F-2(b)(1) refers to those who report a reasonable belief of a
potential securities laws violations, while § 240.21F-9 definition limits “whistleblower”
only to those who be eligible for an award under the original Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(b), 240.21F-9. Thus, deference should still be given to
the SEC’s regulations.
126. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9.
127. § 240.21F-4(c)(3).
128. § 240.21F-4(b)(iv)(7).
129. § 240.21F-4(a)(4).
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to be a “tool designed to increase the effectiveness of the enforcement
program.”130 If courts choose to ignore the SEC’s regulations and not
expand whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions, it will be contrary to
Congress’s stated intent. It does not make sense that Congress and the
SEC would intend to incentivize reporting yet leave employees in
situations where “individuals who take socially-desirous actions fail to
be granted protection.”131 Therefore, the SEC’s regulations are a
reasonable and permissible interpretation of the statute, and they should
receive deference under the second step of the Chevron test.
Accordingly, after a complete application of the Chevron doctrine,
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions should be expanded to protect
employees who are identified as whistleblowers in the Definition
Section and to those who make internal disclosures under the Antiretaliation Section without reporting to the SEC.
B.

Abandoning Chevron for New Textualism

An emerging trend in regulatory interpretation involves the
courts willingness to abandon the key principles of Chevron, thereby
shifting the focus from a search for congressional intent to one of
textual clarity.132 In deciding “whether Congress had directly spoken to
the precise question at issue,” a court may give less weight to the
legislative history, and give more weight to the statute’s text.133 In
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,134 he
argued that the legislative history of a statute should be ignored unless
there is a justification for “a departure from the ordinary meaning of [a]
word.” The only justification he deemed strong enough was if there
was evidence that the ordinary definition rendered the statute bizarre or
absurd.135 This new method of statutory interpretation has been termed

130. Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Opening
Meeting—Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2012).
131. Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
132. See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 173–74 (2012).
133. Id. at 173–75 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
134. 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id.; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 651
(1990).
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“new textualism.”136
New textualist judges “may believe they are better able to
interpret statutes than agencies are, and accordingly . . . [may] ignore
the spirit of Chevron.”137 New textualist judges ignore legislative
history and instead examine the “statute’s structure, prior judicial
opinions, established judicial ‘canons’ of statutory construction,
administrative norms underlying the statute’s implementation,
comparisons with the accepted interpretations of comparable statutory
provisions, and the dictionary meanings most congruous with ordinary
English usage and applicable law.”138
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC,139 is exemplary of the new
textualism approach in determining whether an employee must report to
the SEC to be protected by the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
In Bussing, an employee brought a retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank,
asserting her employer terminated her after reporting to her employer
potential violations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
The court
(“FINRA”) rules and federal securities laws.140
acknowledged the tension between the Dodd-Frank Definition Section
and the Anti-retaliation Section, but the court did not, ultimately, reach
the second step of Chevron and defer to the SEC’s regulation.141
Although, Dodd-Frank has a statutory definition of
“whistleblower,” the court held this was an unusual case where
“whistleblower” should be given its ordinary meaning instead of its
statutory definition.142 According to the court, if the statutory definition
was used, “subsection (iii) [of the Anti-retaliation Section would] be
rendered insignificant, and its purpose—to shield a broad range of
employee disclosures—[would] be thwarted.”143 Because the statutory
definition should not be controlling if it defeats the purpose of the
statute, under the new textualism approach the court applied the
Under its dictionary definition, a
dictionary definition.144
136. Eskridge, supra note 135, at 623.
137. Mank, supra note 97, at 576
138. Id. at 538–39.
139. 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. May 21, 2014) (finding that congressional intent

was unclear, and that the court would have to “return[] to the text of the statute”).
140. Id. at 719–26.
141. Id. at 729.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. nn.7–8.
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“whistleblower” is “a person who tells police, reporters, etc., about
something (such as a crime) that has been kept secret,”145 or an
“employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or lawenforcement agency.”146 By imputing the ordinary definition instead of
the statutory definition, the court’s interpretation focuses only on the
text in the statute, avoids any surplusage, and still reaches the same
result as the SEC’s regulations.147 Consequently, even if courts
abandon the two-step process from Chevron, new textualism would still
mandate that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank incorporate
the SOX provisions—ensuring protection for internal disclosures of
corporate wrongdoing.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
POLICIES
Under Dodd-Frank, “whistleblowers provide a vital early
warning system to detect and expose fraud in the financial system.”148
Since the passage of Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, the SEC has
received almost 10,200 tips and complaints from whistleblowers.149
With the number of reports increasing each year, it is important for
whistleblowers to be protected from employer retaliation. Hence, all
parties who could be involved in a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim
must recognize the current legal landscape and the implications of the
lack of a consensus on the definition of whistleblower.150
The split in the federal courts over whether Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protections only apply to employees who report directly
to the SEC impacts the decisions made by employees. First, the split
affects where an employee will choose to report potential securities law
violations. The court in Bussing argued that the narrow definition of a
whistleblower was “under-inclusive” from the employee’s perspective,
145. Id. (quoting Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary, s.v. “Whistleblower”,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 5, 2014)).
146. Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1734 (9th ed. 2009)).
147. Id. at 730–31.
148. 156 Cong. Rec. S4066 (daily ed. May 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kaufman).
149. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 2.
150. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & JEREMY B. MERKELSON, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL, TOP TEN
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES NOW SUBJECT TO SOX WHISTLEBLOWER
LAWSUITS
(2014),
available
at
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/ttcfpcnstswl.cfm?makepdf=1.
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because it “fails to account for the fact that employees tend to report
matters internally before going to the SEC.”151 Employees who are not
enticed by the potential financial gain or who are loyal to their
companies may first report internally to give their companies the
opportunity to remedy the problem before going to the SEC.152 If
employees choose to report internally and not to the SEC, they would
not qualify as whistleblowers under the strict Asadi interpretation of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
Secondly, if an employee is fired after reporting internally, the
courts disagree on which retaliation claims the employee is entitled to
bring. In jurisdictions that follow a narrow “whistleblower” definition,
an employee can only bring a SOX retaliation claim if no report was
made to the SEC.153 In jurisdictions that hold that the Dodd-Frank Antiretaliation Section incorporates the SOX protection for internal
reporting, employees may invoke the “plaintiff-friendly aspects of
Dodd-Frank” that provides a longer statute of limitations, double back
pay, and eligibility for the larger Dodd-Frank bounty program.154 It is
unreasonable to think Congress intended to “offer a broad array of
protections with one hand, only to snatch it back with the other, leaving
behind protection for only a narrow subset of whistleblower,” yet this is
the practical implication of Asadi for employees.155
Employers also have to deal with practical implications of Asadi
and subsequent decisions. However, regardless of how the Supreme
Court eventually rules, the outcome will have a negative impact on
employees.156 Companies, through their internal compliance programs,
try to persuade employees to report internally first.157 But, even if the
current SEC rules are given deference, some critics do not think that the
SEC’s regulations are enough to encourage internal reporting.158 SEC
Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 732.
Id.
Shen, supra note 30 at 3.
Id. at 4.
Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733.
Shen, supra note 30 at 4.
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, CORPORATE
LITIGATION; DODD-FRANK AND WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: WHO QUALIFIES? (Aug. 8,
2013), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existingcontent/publications/pub1637.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
158. See Kathleen Casey, Comm’r, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Adoption of Rules for
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (May 25, 2011); Troy Paredes, Comm’r, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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Commissioner Kathleen Casey expressed concern that
the
whistleblower program promulgated under the current regulations
“significantly underestimates the negative impact on
internal
159
compliance programs.” If internal reports and disclosures are not
protected, employees may skip internal reports and go directly to the
SEC for a potential monetary award and for the protection of the DoddFrank anti-retaliation provisions.160 Anytime that internal reporting is
bypassed, internal compliance programs lose the opportunity to quickly
identify if there is a violation that needs to be fixed, or if there has just
been a simple misunderstanding.161 Conversely, if the Dodd-Frank antiretaliation provisions are expanded to those who report internally,
employers face increased liability and vulnerability to retaliation claims,
which could raise the cost of litigation and the amount of damages paid
for retaliation claims.162
Furthermore, the conflicting holdings regarding who is
protected by the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions have a
significant impact on the SEC. Due to decreased reliance on internal
reporting, disclosures that could be handled more efficiently internally
will instead be sent to the SEC.163 Commissioner Casey also believed
the current SEC regulations “significantly overstat[e] [the SEC’s]
capacity to effectively triage and manage whistleblower complaints.”164
Ideally, the SEC would want fewer and higher quality tips, but with
employees bypassing internal reporting, there could easily be a
significant waste of corporate and government resources.165 Because of
the greater number of disclosures, the SEC could become burdened with
an overwhelming number of claims, likely resulting in the SEC’s
inability to discover and address issues in a timely manner.166
To resolve the conflict in the courts, the Fifth Circuit’s holding
should be overruled by the Supreme Court. This would grant
Open Meeting to Adopt Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011).
159. Casey, supra note 158.
160. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157.
161. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733; Casey, supra note 158; MCLAUGHLIN, supra note
157.
162. Shen, supra note 30 at 4.
163. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733.
164. Casey, supra note 158.
165. Id.
166. Paredes, supra note 158.
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employees the freedom to choose who they will report to, but will also
assure protection from retaliation no matter what they decide.
Simplifying the law by giving deference to the SEC’s broad definition
of a whistleblower, would also ensure an efficient working relationship
between the SEC and internal compliance programs.167 By viewing the
Anti-retaliation Section as dictating categories of whistleblowers, not
just actions protected for whistleblowers, employees will be protected if
they report either internally or to the SEC.168 Giving deference to the
SECs regulations would protect any disclosures made under the Antiretaliation Section, allowing compliance departments to focus more on
issues being reported and less on the potential costs of litigation.169
This clarification of the whistleblower policies under the Dodd-Frank is
supported by the correct application of the Chevron process and the
doctrine of new textualism. By creating a safe environment for
employees to come forward internally, and also allowing employees to
go directly to the SEC, the federal whistleblower program will be able
to reach its full potential to monitor the financial system.
CAROLINE E. KEEN

167.
168.
169.

MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157.
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157.
Shen, supra note 30 at 4.
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APPENDIX
Cases Citing Asadi and Defining “Whistleblower”
Case
Facts
Holding
1st Circuit
Employee reported to
Court found the SEC
compliance officer that construction of the
Ellington v.
the company was
statute more
Giacoumakis, 977 F.
potentially violating
persuasive and held
Supp. 2d 42 (D.
security laws by
Anti-retaliation
Mass. 2013).
distributing misleading Section protected
investment reports.
internal disclosures.
2nd Circuit
Employee was
Court required that
Berman v.
terminated for
the whistleblower
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, reporting internally,
report to the SEC to
2014 U.S. Dist.
and after he was fired
be protected based on
LEXIS 168840
reported potential
the text of the statute
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
violations to the SEC.
and traditional canons
2014).
of statutory
construction.
Employee was based in Court did not extend
Ulrich v. Moody’s
Hong Kong and
whistleblower
Corp., 2014 U.S.
reported to the SEC.
protections
Dist. LEXIS 138082
extraterritorially or
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
comment on reporting
2014).
to the SEC.
Employee reported
Court upheld the SEC
potential shareholder
regulations resolved
fraud and potential
the ambiguity over
Yang v. Navigators
violations of securities
the “whistleblower”
Grp., Inc., 18 F.
laws and regulations.
definition and the
Supp. 3d 519
Sought damages under employee was
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
both Sarbanes-Oxley
protected by Doddand Dodd-Frank.
Frank even though
she only reported
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Ahmad v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., 2 F.
Supp. 3d 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).

Rosenblum v.
Thomson Reuters
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F.
Supp. 2d 141
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Murray v. UBS
Secs., LLC, 2013
WL 2190084
(S.D.N.Y. May 21,
2013).

Kramer v. TransLux Corp., 2012 WL
4444820 (D. Conn.
Sept. 25, 2012).

Egan v.
Tradingscreen, Inc.,
2011 WL 1672066
(S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2011).

Employee made an
internal report before
the passage of the
Dodd Frank.

Employee was fired
after internal reports
and reports to the FBI
concerning insider
trading.

Employee repeatedly
told supervisors about
research reports that
were in violation of
federal securities laws.

Employee reported
concern about the
conflict of interest,
composition of the
pension plan
committee, and the
failure to present the
2009 amendment to the
appropriate bodies.
Employee reported
diversion of corporate
assets to another
company.
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internally.
Court would not
apply the Dodd Frank
retroactively to
retaliatory actions that
would have been
covered by SOX.
Court used Chevron
analysis and deferred
to the agency’s
interpretation, that if
the employee met the
requirements of SOX
they were covered
under Anti-retaliation
Section.
Court held there are
two plausible
interpretations of the
Anti-retaliation
Section, so it is
inherently ambiguous,
and courts should
defer to the SEC.
Court protected the
whistleblower by
deferring to the SEC’s
interpretation of the
Anti-retaliation
Section.

Court found that (iii)
of the Anti-retaliation
Section creates a
narrow exception so
that a plaintiff is
required to show that
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Meng-Lin Liu v.
Siemens A.G., 978
F. Supp. 2d 325
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Employee of a Chinese
subsidiary who resided
in Taiwan reported a
potential violation of
the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.

Liu Meng-Lin v.
Siemens, 2014 WL
3953672 (2d Cir.
Aug. 14, 2014).

Employee of a Chinese
subsidiary who resided
in Taiwan reported a
potential violation of
the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.

Safarian v. Am. DG
Energy Inc., 2014
WL 1744989 (D.N.J.
Apr. 29, 2014) cert.
granted (No. 142734).

Khazin v. TD
Ameritrade Holding
Corp., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31142
(D.N.J. Mar. 11,
2014).

3rd Circuit
Employee disclosed
overbilling that was not
close enough related to
fraud.

Employee reported that
financial products
offered to customers
were not in compliance
with relevant securities
violations.
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he either provided
information to the
SEC or the
disclosures fell under
the four categories
listed in (iii).
Court did not “wade
into the debate” over
the whistleblower
definition because the
Dodd Frank and SOX
protections do not
apply
extraterritorially.
Court did not mention
the definition of the
whistleblower. Found
nothing that
suggested Congress
intended
extraterritorial
application.
Court does not weigh
in on the definition of
the whistleblower
who failed to show
that his disclosures
fell under any of the
protected actions of
the Anti-retaliation
Section.
Court took the
majority view of the
statute being
ambiguous and held
that the employee had
sufficiently pled a
Dodd Frank Act.

2015]

WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER DODD-FRANK

Asadi v. G.E.
Energy United
States, L.L.C., 720
F.3d 620 (5th Cir.
2013).

Nollner v. S. Baptist
Convention, Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 2d 986
(M.D. Tenn. 2012).

Verfuerth v. Orion
Energy Sys., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
156620 (E.D. Wis.
Nov. 4, 2014).

Zillges v. Kenney
Bank & Trust, 24 F.
Supp. 3d 795 (E.D.
Wis. 2014).

5th Circuit
Employee internally
reported possible
violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
when a woman was
hired to garter favor
with a local official.

6th Circuit
Employer reported
concerns about
potential bribery to his
supervisors under the
Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.
7th Circuit
Employer was the CEO
but was removed by the
board of directors after
complaints of potential
securities law
violations.

Employee reported
violations of banking
regulations.
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Court applied a strict
definition of a
“whistleblower” as
defined in the statute
and did not apply the
Dodd-Frank
protections to the
whistleblower
because he did not
report internally and
to the SEC.
Court held that
reported violations
did not relate to
violations of
securities laws and
was not protected by
Dodd-Frank.
Court held there was
no ambiguity in the
statute and an
employee did not fall
within the protections
of the Anti-retaliation
Section because he
did not report to the
SEC.
Acknowledges the
disagreement among
the federal courts but
does not take sides on
the issue. Failed to
qualify as a
whistleblower
because he reported
banking not securities
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law violations.

Bussing v. COR
Clearing, LLC, 20 F.
Supp. 3d 719 (D.
Neb. 2014)

Connolly v. Remkes,
2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 153439,
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
2014)

Banko v. Apple Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 3d 749
(N.D. Cal. 2013)

Azim v. Tortoise
Capital Advisors,
LLC, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22974
(D. Kan. Feb. 24,
2014)

8th Circuit
Employee reported
violations of Financial
Industry Regulatory
Authority Rules as
required under Rule
820 as part of an
investigation.
9th Circuit
Employee pled
constructive discharge
after she reported
potential a violation of
FINRA Rule 3240’s
ban on broker
payments into client
accounts.

Employee reported to
upper management
fraud and
embezzlement of
company funds.

10th Circuit
Employee reported
fraudulent
representations to gain
potential investments
and investors and false
filings with the SEC to
supervisors.

Court applied the
everyday definition of
a whistleblower to
provide protection to
a full range of
disclosures.

Court adopted the
majority view that the
Anti-retaliation
Section is ambiguous
and that under
Chevron, deference
should be given to the
reasonable SEC
interpretation
extending
whistleblower
protections.
Court dismissed
whistleblower’s claim
because it found no
proof that the SEC
issued its regulation
because the Antiretaliation Section
was ambiguous.
Court pointed out that
the 10th Circuit had
not addressed the
issue and allowed the
employee to amend
his complaint.

2015]

WHISTLEBLOWERS UNDER DODD-FRANK

Wagner v. Bank of
Am. Corp., 2013
WL 3786643 (D.
Colo. July 19, 2013)

Englehart v. Career
Educ. Corp., 2014
WL 2619501 (M.D.
Fla. May 12, 2014)

Employee reported of
alleged violations of
the Uniform Standards
of Professional
Appraisal Practice
(USPAP).

11th Circuit
Employee was placed
on leave after voicing
concerns about material
misrepresentations,
which violated
Securities Exchange
Act and anti-fraud
provisions.
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Court was concerned
that expanding the
whistleblower
definition would
render SOX moot so
it quoted and
completely agreed
with Asadi.
Court followed Asadi
and did not apply
Dodd-Frank
protections because it
was Congress’s
prerogative to define
the term
“whistleblower.”

